INTRODUCTION

The duty to render justice within the framework of the law does not require a judge to be infallible. It does, however, require that the judge remain the true author of the decision rendered, exercise judicial discretion, and refrain from substituting an administrative or computer-based practice to his own reasoning.

On August 5, 2026, the Committee of Inquiry (the Committee) of the Conseil de la magistrature du Québec (the CMQ) released its report regarding judges Martin Gosselin and Joanne Cousineau of the Municipal Court of the City in Gatineau (the Report[1]), in which it concludes to a misconduct that was “exceptionally serious”[2] and recommended that the Minister of Justice and Attorney General apply to the Court of Appeal for their removal from office.

At the heart of the matter: the issuance of 1,669 warrants of imprisonment, between June 2020 and December 2022, for failure to pay fines which would have been issued without reviewing the files, without evidence, without substantive submissions, and without the judges themselves determining the length of the sentences, opting instead to rely on a software to automatically calculate them.

Of public interest, the Report addresses the duty to render justice within the framework of the law and helps clarify the boundary between a mere error of law that may be corrected on appeal and a conduct capable of engaging a judge’s ethical responsibility.

FACTS

The matter begins with David Bonfond, who is sentenced to 60 days of imprisonment for unpaid fines. Before the Superior Court, his recourse for certiorari and habeas corpus revealed a process that, according to the evidence retained by the Superior Court, circumvented several safeguards set out in the Code of Penal Procedure. The Superior Court therefore set aside the warrants issued against him.

A broader verification following that decision led the Superior Court to set aside all 1,669 warrants issued by Judges Gosselin and Cousineau.

The process summarized by the Committee is striking: cases were dealt in batches, without any individualized review of the files. The length of the sentences was not personally determined by the judge hearing the matter, but instead automatically calculated by a software configured for that purpose. In short, in the absence of the defendants, the judges proceeded by default, rendered judgment from the bench “without written judgements, without reasons, without submissions from the prosecutor or the fine collector, without evidence, without a file and without determining the length of the sentence of imprisonment”[3], and then signed warrants of imprisonment in batches.

In short, the exercise of judicial authority itself was replaced by an administrative computer-based practice applied systematically.

Following the revocation of the 1,669 warrants of imprisonment (1,113 signed by Judge Gosselin and 556 by Judge Cousineau), Me Christian Tanguay, in his capacity as deputy director general of the administrative services of the City of Gatineau, filed a complaint to the CMQ against judges Gosselin and Cousineau, alleging that the warrants of imprisonment had been issued unlawfully and in violation of sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Code of Ethics for Municipal Judges of Québec (the Code of Ethics).

In the Report, the Committee recommends to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General that they apply to the Court of Appeal for the judges’ removal from office on the basis of breaches of sections 1, 2, 3, 5 and 9 of the Code of Ethics:

• Section 1 (Render justice within the framework of the law): the judges demonstrated a gross ignorance[4] for the applicable law, having no knowledge, even at a minimal level, of the content of sections 346 and 347 of the Code of Penal Procedure despite presiding over applications for an order of imprisonment.
• Section 2 (Integrity, dignity and honour): the judges treated the process with obvious carelessness, casualness and lack of seriousness incompatible with their duties.
• Section 3 (Professional competence): they blindly trusted the existing process without sufficiently verifying the applicable legal framework, contrary to their duty to foster and maintain their professional competence.
• Sections 5 (Impartiality and objectivity) and 9 (Independence and integrity of the judiciary): they allegedly failed to exercise their own judgment in each case, preferring instead to reduce their role to approving the prosecution’s applications and applying an automated computerized system.

COMMENTS ON THE REPORT

Although the Committee’s recommendation that the judges be removed from office flows from its overall analysis and the extent of the misconducts it identified, this article focuses more specifically on the Committee’s comments regarding section 1 of the Code of Ethics, namely the duty to render justice within the framework of the law.

The Report forms part of a recent body of case law concerning this duty, which finds its parallel in the codes of ethics applicable to judges sitting on various administrative and judicial tribunals.

Indeed, the duty to render justice within the framework of the law raises an important question: how can judicial independence be reconciled with ethical review?

Recent Developments Concerning the Duty to Render Justice Within the Framework of the Law

Over the past few years, Quebec courts have been called upon to clarify the scope of a judge’s duty to render justice within the framework of the law, particularly where an ethical complaint is based on an alleged error of law. Two decisions referred to by the Committee in its Report shed light on the distinction between a judicial error that is subject to appeal or review and an ethical misconduct.

In Descôteaux[5], the committee of inquiry established by the CMQ concluded that the judge had breached her duty to render justice within the framework of the law when her questioning led a witness to reveal his alleged status as a police informant. In reaching that conclusion, the committee adopted an approach that had, until then, left open the possibility that gross ignorance of a rule of law could, by itself, constitute an ethical breach. The Superior Court nevertheless decisively departed from this approach and concluded that the committee’s link between gross ignorance of the law and the duty to render justice within the framework of the law amounted to an unreasonable conclusion. Although the Court did not clearly define what constitutes “gross ignorance” of the law, it stated that section 1 of the Code of Ethics cannot be invoked to sanction errors of law, whether gross or otherwise[6]. The committee of inquiry had thus usurped the role of a court of appeal, assumed a jurisdiction it did not possess and, consequently, rendered an unreasonable decision[7].

However, the Superior Court’s decision rendered a few months later in Gauthier[8] added nuance to that conclusion: while a good-faith error of law cannot, in itself, establish a breach of professional ethics[9], gross ignorance of the law can do so[10].

This distinction is critical. A legally erroneous decision is normally addressed through mechanisms of appeal or judicial review. However, where the error reflects a clear disregard for a fundamental rule, an abandonment of legal methodology, or an intention to evade the constraints imposed by law, it may also assume an ethical dimension.

The two decisions must therefore be read together. Descôteaux protects judicial independence by ensuring that ethical duties cannot be used as an indirect means of sanctioning mere errors of law. Gauthier, however, reminds us that this protection does not grant disciplinary immunity to a judge who fails to genuinely engage in the judicial function in accordance with the law.

The distinction therefore lies less in the characterization of the error and more in demonstrating conduct that reveals an ethical fault in the exercise of judicial authority. This is precisely the nuance that the Report appears to adopt today: an error of law does not automatically constitute an ethical breach; nevertheless, it may become one when it signals a serious refusal to subject the exercise of judicial functions to the requirements of the law.

The Test Emerging from the Report

In this context, the Report now proposes a central question when addressing the duty to render justice within the framework of the law: is the judge seeking to act within the framework of the law, or is the judge acting on the basis of other considerations? Put differently, “does he seek to implement the rules of law as he understands them?”[11]

According to the Committee, this question requires an assessment of whether the judge demonstrates a “plain and obvious”[12] intention to implement the applicable legal rules.

This approach establishes a useful guideline: where a judge genuinely attempts to understand and apply the law, an interpretive error will generally fall within the realm of judicial review. Conversely, when the judge refuses to examine the law, the evidence, or the essential conditions governing the exercise of their function, the matter enters the sphere of judicial ethics.

[120] To maintain public confidence in judicial institutions, a judge must clearly demonstrate in their decision that the ruling is based on legal reasoning and that the dispute is not being resolved arbitrarily or with carelessness for the legal system. The legitimacy of the authority exercised by the judge depends upon it. The broad discretion available in the exercise of the judge’s functions is absolutely essential to judicial independence. It must nevertheless be exercised within the legal framework established by the society that entrusts judges with their responsibilities and grants them their authority.”[13]

Consistent with the teachings of the Superior Court in Descôteaux and Gauthier, the Committee found that three situations may give rise to a breach of section 1 of the Code of Ethics:

1. A deliberate refusal to apply the law, motivated by bad faith or out of caprice;
2. A deliberate refusal to apply the law in the name of a noble cause or what the judge personally considers to be just; and
3. An error of law due to ignorance, where that ignorance is gross[14].

Ultimately, the Committee concluded that the misconduct attributed to judges Gosselin and Cousineau falls within the ethical sphere: “their method of proceeding demonstrates serious negligence with respect to their role, their obligation to know the law and comply with its requirements, and the consequences of their decisions for defendants”[15]. The errors of law identified were therefore not attributable to a mere incorrect interpretation, but rather to a gross ignorance of the judicial role and of legal rules that were “clear and long established”[16].

The importance given by the Committee to the clear and well-established nature of the laws that were ignored raises an important question: could a new, ambiguous or legally uncertain rule, in some circumstances, preclude a conclusion of ethical misconduct even where said misconduct appears, at first glance, to reflect gross ignorance? It will be interesting to see how courts and disciplinary bodies take this factor into account in future analyses.

CONCLUSION

The duty to render justice within the framework of the law does not require that a judge be infallible. It does, however, require that the judge truly act as the judge in the matter: reviewing the file, assessing the evidence, hearing the relevant submissions and personally exercising the authority entrusted by law.

In most cases, an error of law belongs to the realm of appeals and judicial review. Judicial ethics is not a parallel avenue of appeal. It may nevertheless come into play where the error does not arise from a legal analysis in good faith but instead results from a refusal to consider the applicable law, the absence of any independent analysis, or the replacement of the adjudicative process required by the judiciary function with an administrative process.

The Gosselin and Cousineau matter thus highlights an essential limit: judicial independence protects the freedom to judge, but not the right to avoid judging. The individualization of decisions, the exercise of judgment, and the provision of reasons are not mere formalities.

Ultimately, the public does not expect judges to be right all the time. It must, however, be able to see that they themselves have applied the law.

In the Gosselin and Cousineau matter, it is precisely because the judges had ceased to judge that their conduct crossed the boundary into professional misconduct.

[1] Report of the Committee of Inquiry of the Conseil de la magistrature in the Matters of 2024-CMQC-066 and 2024-CMQC-067 dated August 5, 2026, available on the CMQ’s website : Gabarit EDJ (French only).

[2] Summary of the Report, available on the CMQ’s website: Summary_-_Committee_of_Inquiry_Report.pdf.

[3] Report of the CMQ, para. 15. Our translation of : « sans écrit, sans motif, sans observation de l’avocat de la poursuite ou du percepteur des amendes, sans preuve, sans dossier et sans déterminer la durée de la peine d’emprisonnement ».

[4] Our translation of “grossière ignorance”.

[5] Descôteaux c. Conseil de la magistrature du Québec, 2025 QCCS 2535.

[6] Id., para. 54.

[7] Id., para. 58.

[8] Gauthier c. Conseil de la justice administrative, 2026 QCCS 6.

[9] Id., para. 139.

[10] Id., para. 135.

[11] Report, para. 118. Our translation of : « A-t-il le souci de mettre en œuvre les règles de droit telles qu’il les comprend ? »

[12] Report, para. 119. Our translation of : « évidente et manifeste ».

[13] Report, para. 120. Our translation of : « Pour maintenir la confiance du public dans les institutions judiciaires, le juge doit clairement montrer dans son jugement que la décision qu’il prend est fondée sur un raisonnement juridique, que le litige n’est pas tranché de manière arbitraire ou avec insouciance par rapport au système de droit. La légitimité du pouvoir qu’il exerce en dépend. La grande liberté dont il dispose dans l’exercice de ses fonctions est absolument indispensable à l’indépendance judiciaire. Elle doit cependant être exercée en respectant le cadre légal, tel qu’il est défini par la société qui lui confie ses responsabilités et lui attribue son autorité. »

[14] Report, para. 121.

[15] Report, para. 124. Our translation of : « Leur façon de procéder témoigne d’une négligence grossière à l’égard de leur rôle, de leur obligation de connaître la loi et d’en respecter les exigences, ainsi que des conséquences de leurs décisions pour les défendeurs. »

[16] Report, para. 122. Our translation of : « claires et établies depuis longtemps ».