The Autorité des marchés publics (AMP) and the Bureau de l’inspecteur général de la ville de Montréal (BIG) are each independently entrusted with a general mandate of promoting and safeguarding integrity in the awarding and performance of public contracts. The AMP is responsible, among other things, for overseeing enterprises participating in provincial public contracts[1], whereas the BIG oversees the contracting processes and the carrying out of contracts involving the city of Montreal (the City).[2]

Their investigations, conducted in particular in connection with reviews of the integrity of the enterprises concerned and of their contractual performance, may include inspection visits (with the seizure of information) as burdensome as searches and may therefore have significant repercussions on the management of their activities and operations.

Indeed, in the performance of its functions, the BIG has the statutory power to enter, at any reasonable hour, any building in order to examine any book, register or record relevant to the fulfilment of its mandate.[3] The AMP, for its part, has the statutory power to enter any premises where documents or information may be held that would enable it to verify whether an enterprise subject to its oversight meets the applicable standards of integrity.[4] These powers are not, however, subject to the requirement that a warrant (usually required for searches) be obtained beforehand.

Beyond the recommendations these two bodies may issue following their investigations, the decisions of the AMP and the BIG can be particularly detrimental to an enterprise. Depending on the circumstances and on which body conducts the investigation, such decisions may revoke an enterprise’s authorization to contract with public bodies[5], place it in the register of enterprises ineligible for public contracts (RENA) or recommend its placement in the register of enterprises ineligible for contracts with the City[6], impose the payment of monetary penalties[7], and suspend or terminate existing contracts.[8]

In fact, certain judicial decisions illustrate the tangible consequences of AMP and BIG decisions for businesses.

9104-8306 Québec inc. (Code Bleu Placement en santé) v. AMP, 2026 QCCS 398

In this case, following an integrity review, the AMP revoked the authorizations to contract with public bodies of four agencies specializing in the placement of healthcare professionals. The review had been initiated by the AMP following a call for tenders issued by the Centre d’acquisitions gouvernementales.

In concluding that the agencies had failed to meet the integrity standards prescribed by the Act respecting contracting by public bodies (ARCPB), the AMP first found that each of them was wholly owned by the same investment company. At the time of the call for tenders in question, the director of that company oversaw the tendering processes and managed the agencies’ bids. In addition, certain individuals simultaneously held the position of general manager at two of the agencies. The AMP therefore found in its decision that, over a continuous period, the agencies had shared strategic information and lacked independence and autonomy, notably in the preparation of bids. The AMP also noted that certain directors, officers or representatives had made false and misleading statements in the course of the integrity review.[9]

The agencies applied for judicial review of the AMP’s decision, but the Superior Court dismissed their application, finding, among other things, that the AMP’s decision was reasonable. The revocation of the agencies’ authorizations was therefore upheld, as was their listing in the RENA for a period of five years.

11073192 Canada inc. (Déneigement Na-Sa) v. AMP, 2026 QCCS 2632

In this case, the AMP refused to renew a snow removal company’s authorization to contract.

The AMP found that the company’s incorporation was, in fact, merely a continuation of an enterprise previously listed in the RENA. It noted that this had enabled the enterprise to circumvent the application of the ARCPB by avoiding the consequences of being listed in the RENA. In reaching that conclusion, the AMP relied in particular on the family ties between the officers of the two entities and their sharing of resources.[10]

The snow removal company and its two directors applied for judicial review. The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the decision-making process complied with procedural fairness and that the AMP’s decision was reasonable.

The Superior Court concluded that, in light of the evidence gathered, the AMP was entitled to determine that the company was a continuation of the enterprise previously listed in the RENA.[11] The AMP’s refusal to renew the company’s authorization, as well as its listing in the RENA for a period of five years, were therefore upheld.

Mainville v. Ville de Montréal, 2024 QCCA 1276

In this case, the appellant was the sole shareholder and president of a snow removal company that had been awarded five contracts by the City, the respondent, following calls for tenders between 2016 and 2022.

In December 2021, the BIG launched an investigation of the appellant and his company after receiving reports alleging that the company had allowed two publicly tendered contracts to be performed by an individual who was ineligible for public contracts. In 2016, that same individual and the companies under their direction had been barred by the City, for a period of five years, from participating in any call for tenders, entering into any subcontract or being awarded any contract by mutual agreement with the City. An investigation conducted by the BIG at that time had revealed that the individual had initiated communications with a competitor in an effort to enter into collusive agreements.[12]

The BIG’s report concluded that the appellant and his company had allowed the individual to perform several snow removal contracts through a subcontracting company that he de facto controlled pursuant to a fronting arrangement entered into with its official director. According to the report, the appellant had personal knowledge of the individual’s ineligibility, their de facto control of the subcontracting company and their involvement in the performance of the contracts. The BIG then decided to terminate the company’s two ongoing contracts and recommended that the company and the appellant be placed on an ineligibility list for a period of five years, on the basis of contraventions of the Règlement du conseil de la ville sur la gestion contractuelle (RGC).[13]

Following some exchanges between the company, the appellant and the City, the City’s Executive Committee passed a resolution imposing sanctions on the various parties involved. In particular, the appellant, the ineligible individual, the subcontracting company and its official director who had facilitated the fronting arrangement, were declared ineligible for any call for tenders, any subcontract or any contract by mutual agreement with the City, for periods ranging from three to five years.[14]

On judicial review before the Superior Court, the appellant argued unsuccessfully, among other things, that the relevant provisions of the RGC were invalid and that the Executive Committee’s resolution was unfounded and unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal first confirmed that the City could legitimately establish a mechanism providing for temporary ineligibility to contract with it, notwithstanding the existence of a similar regime administered by the AMP and applicable to Québec public contracts.[15] The Court of Appeal further confirmed that the resolution was reasonable and dismissed the appeal.

Key takeaways

Enterprises subject to integrity reviews and investigations conducted by the AMP and the BIG are therefore involved in a process that may have significant consequences for their activities, operations and financial position.

This process is particularly burdensome, in particular because of the broad investigative powers vested in the AMP and the BIG.

Decisions rendered by the AMP or the BIG as a result of this process may go so far as to prevent the enterprise in question from entering into public contracts or subcontracts that may lie at the very heart of its business.

Given the significance of the interests at stake and the consequences that may flow from an integrity review or investigation, affected enterprises would be well advised to adopt a rigorous approach and surround themselves with the necessary expertise to, most notably, protect their rights and interests.

[1] Act respecting contracting by public bodies, RLRQ c. C-65.1 [ARCPB], s. 21.48.1.

[2] Charter of Ville de Montréal, metropolis of Québec, RLRQ c. C-11.4 [Charter], s. 57.1.8.

[3] Id., s. 57.1.9.

[4] ARCPB, s. 21.48.10.

[5] Regarding this power of the AMP, see Id., ss. 21.38 and 21.48.4.

[6] Regarding the AMP and the RENA, see Id., ss. 21.4, 21.6 and 21.48.4; regarding the power of the BIG to recommend a placement in the register of enterprises ineligible for contracts with the City, see Charter, s. 57.1.8 and Règlement du conseil de la Ville sur la gestion contractuelle, #18-038 [RGC], ss. 23, 24, 27 and 31.

[7] Regarding the power of the AMP to impose monetary administrative penalties, see ARCPB, s. 27.15.

[8] This is a power the BIG may exercise in certain circumstances, see Charter, s. 57.1.10.

[9] 9104-8306 Québec inc. (Code Bleu Placement en santé) v. AMP, 2026 QCCS 398, par. 9 – 19.

[10] 11073192 Canada inc. (Déneigement Na-Sa) v. AMP, 2026 QCCS 2632, par. 2, 21 and 48.

[11] Id., par. 48 – 49.

[12] Mainville v. Ville de Montréal, 2024 QCCA 1276, par. 5 – 6.

[13] Id., par. 7 – 9.

[14] Id., par. 10 – 12.

[15] Id., par. 64 – 66.